











HOW TO SOLVE THE RIDDLE OF BELATED EURO 




















The Webpublications series comprises studies carried out as part of the activities of the WRR. 
Responsibility for the content and views expressed rests with the authors. A list of all 
Webpublications can be found on the WRR. 
 3 
CONTENTS 
1 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 4 
2 The introduction of the euro in the netherlands ............................................................ 6 
2.1 Preliminaries and Preparations: 1992 1998............................................................... 8 
2.2 The Introduction of the Euro..................................................................................... 11 
2.3 The Aftermath........................................................................................................... 19 
3 How to explain the riddle of belated contestation? ...................................................... 22 
4 Could contestation have been avoided?........................................................................30 
4.1 Policy Mistakes .........................................................................................................30 





Monetary issues are usually left to economic experts at two removes from the electorate. In 
fact, standard World Bank prescriptions regarding ‘good governance’ in developing countries 
conventionally entail the prescription to establish an independent central bank in charge of 
monetary policy. Both for good intrinsic reasons – monetary policy making is too 
complicated to be left to political dilettantes – and for good extrinsic reasons – monetary 
stability is too important for collective economic well being to be subjected to the whims of 
the electoral cycle (MacNamara 1998). This type of reasoning can easily explain the rather 
smooth policy trajectory leading up the introduction of the euro in the Netherlands. As Dutch 
public polls show, support for the European project in general and European monetary and 
economic integration in particular has always been comparatively high in the Netherlands, as 
is public trust in the reliability of the Dutch central bank. Even the material replacement of 
the Dutch guilder — one of the oldest currencies in the world and, from the mid 1980s 
onward, a beacon of monetary stability — by the euro in January 2002 did not generate 
strong feelings of protest. However, in the build up to the 2005 referendum on the European 
Constitutional Treaty public complaints about the euro and the inflationary price increases it 
had supposedly caused, suddenly flared up. According to many observers, public discontent 
with the euro contributed substantially to the Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. 
This raises the question why the euro only became contested ex post factum. Was it because 
of a wider societal dissatisfaction with the state of the economy that got projected unto the 
euro, but which had in fact nothing to do with the onset of the economic recession in 2002? 
Was it because of what was initially ‘framed’ as a neutral, technical matter in fact turned out 
to be ordinary distributive politics with diffuse costs for many and highly concentrated gains 
for some? Or was it because of an unfortunate confluence of a number of small policy 
mistakes that could easily have been prevented?  
 
It is the latter explanation that is preferred by the Dutch political elite. For instance, then 
Minister of Finance, Gerrit Zalm, stated bluntly in an interview with the NRC Handelsblad in 
2002 that the beneficial macro economic effects of the euro had been spelled out time and 
time again and hence that politicians were not to blame if the electorate preferred to listen to 
Marco Borsato (a popular Dutch singer) instead of reading the public statements on the euro 
(NRC Handelsblad, 2 January 2002). In other words, it is the stupidity of the voter that is 
behind the belated Dutch contestion of the euro, rather than the arrogance of the political 
elite. The second explanation is a theoretical one and is derived from a rational choice 
perspective within the political sciences that is known as ‘actor centered institutionalism’ 
(Scharpf 1997). This explanation is based on the well known distinction of Fritz Scharpf 
according to whom collective decisions follow either the pattern of pure problem solving or 
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the pattern of a zero sum game. Normatively speaking, problem solving is distributively 
neutral and can hence dispense with strong democratic legitimacy requirements. This is not 
the case with distributive games. Since some are stand to lose while others win, the 
acceptance of the outcomes by the losers requires more than effective collective decision
making. Applied to the case of the euro this would suggest that what was initially ‘framed’ by 
political and economic elites as a matter of pure problem solving was lsowly ‘reframed’ by 
other political agents as an issue of distributive politics with diffuse costs and concentrated 
gains. The final explanation is premised not so much on rationality and perfect knowledge 
but rather on complexity and human fallibility, resulting in policy mistakes and allowing for 
unforeseen contingencies. In this perspective small mistakes can have huge consequences, 
while the solution for decision making lies not so much in better informed policy maker as in 
better policy making procedures (Bovens & ‘t Hart 1996).  
 
The paper begins with a reconstruction of the discussions surrounding the introduction of the 
euro in the Netherlands, starting with the beginning of the preparations in the early 1990s 
right up until the Dutch referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in mid 2005. To do so, the 
thirteen years it took to get from the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 to the rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty in 2005 is divided up in three parts: preliminaries, the actual 
introduction (itself consisting of three phases) and the aftermath. This section is largely 
based on reporting taken from NRC Handelsblad, two other Dutch dailies, as well as some 
secondary literature. Throughout, I give Eurobarometer opinion poll data to illustrate the 
interaction effects between public claims making by political agents and the perceptions of 
voters. Section three focuses on the issue of price rices as a result of the introduction of the 
cash euro. In particular it seeks to answer the questions (i) whether the euro had in fact 
caused price inflation, (ii) why Dutch voters perceived that to be the case, and, finally, (iii) 
how and why the introduction of the euro could play such an important role in the rejection 
of the Constitutional Treaty. Section four addresses the question if and how Dutch policy 
makers could have prevented the mid 2005 contestation over the euro. 
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2 THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EURO IN THE NETHERLANDS 
The Netherlands was one of the few member states that in the immediate aftermath of the 
formal agreement over the Maastricht Treaty appeared to be largely disaffected by the wider 
European electoral backlash against the European Union, its elites, its formal institutes, as 
well as the idea of ‘market making’ or ‘negative integration’ for which, according to many, it 
stood. Despite experiencing an identical reversal in economic fortune, the ratification process 
in Dutch parliament proceeded smoothly — only the Green Party and small Christian parties 
were against monetary integration — while public opinion largely remained in favor of 
European integration, albeit without any strong involvement. Even as late as 9 December 
1995, the NRC Handelsblad could report: ‘In the Netherlands people have remained largely 
indifferent to the prospect of losing their 300 year old currency.’ Disregarding a glitch in 
public support for the euro between 1997 and 2000, the actual introduction of the euro on 1 
January 2002 was actually celebrated as if it really were the historical occasion that it 
actually was. In the Netherlands the electoral backlash did not come right after the 
introduction, but rather with a delay of four and a half years, raising the question what would 
have happened if the Dutch political elite would have decided to gauge the electoral 
sentiment on monetary integration and the replacement of the euro right after the Maastricht 
Treaty, as was done in Denmark and France. In May 2005, just a fortnight before the Dutch 
referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, the NRC Handelsblad captioned: ‘Dutch citizens will 
vote for the euro after all. Referendum is dominated by euro’ (NRC Handelsblad, 19 May 
2005) 
 
The received wisdom is that the so called ‘age of permissiveness’ (Lindberg & Scheingold 
1970) during which the elite driven project of European integration could count on silent 
public support, allowing the elite to dispense with strong legitimating narratives for their 
political actions, came to an end with the arduous ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992, and was replaced — from 1995 onward — by the so called ‘era of dialogue’, during 
which European elites strove to create a more symmetrical relationship with their 
constituencies in order to restore their legitimacy Mak 2001: Ch. 3 and 4). Not so in the 
Netherlands. Eurobarometer data suggest that well into the 1990s the general public kept 
supporting the European project to a much higher degree than in other member states, even 
though voter turnout during EP elections was lower than the European median.  
 
The first breach between the Dutch mass and its elite concerning Europe occurred in 1995 
when the Delors II package turned the Netherlands for the first time in the history of the 
European Union into a net contributor (Mak 2001: 140). Further breaches became apparent 
when the date for the final euro conversion approached. According to the European Value 
Survey, the confidence of the Dutch public in European institutions declined rapidly in the 
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late 1990s to reach a provisional low in 2005 (Prast et al. 2005). While the Dutch used to be 
the most supportive of European integration, since 1991 it has become increasingly less 
supportive (Halman et al. 2005), even though Dutch citizens are still among the three most 
supportive (together with Ireland and Luxembourg) of the project of European unification.  
 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer, No. 61, July 2004. 
 
Why did the age of permissiveness came to an end when it did and what role did the 
introduction of the euro play in its demise? In order to answer these questions I will describe 
in some detail the particularities of the introduction of the euro in the Netherlands as well as 
how the project of monetary integration was presented to the Dutch public by its political and 
economic elites. To do so I follow the three phases of European monetary integration as laid 
down in the Green Paper on the Practical Arrangements for the Introduction of the Single 
Currency of 31 May 1995 (EC 1995). According to this document the final stage of monetary 
integration would consist of three phases. During the first phase, which would start in May 
1998 and end in December 1998, the number of participating countries would be determined 
by means of the criteria of the Growth and Stability Pact and the rates against which national 
currencies would be converted in euros would be fixed. January 1999 would then mark the 
official introduction of the euro as a universal accounting standard, requiring banks and large 
firms to reconstruct their financial administrations and financial interactions upon the euro 
as the accounting unit. This phase would end in December 2001, when the cash euro would 
finally be introduced and would fully replace the national currencies of the participating 
countries. This phase would take only a couple of weeks. However, in order to capture public 
reflections on political discussions surrounding the determination of the timetable itself as 
well as the conversion rates, I start with a subsection devoted to preliminaries and 
preparations, covering the period 1992 1998. 
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2.1 Preliminaries and Preparations: 1992 1998 
Until 1995, the public discussion concerning European monetary integration in the 
Netherlands was dominated by stories about: (i) whether Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and 
Belgium would be able to comply with the criteria of the Growth and Stability Pact; (ii) the 
backlash against the Maastricht Treaty in Germany, France, Great Britain and Denmark; (iii) 
the strains within the European Monetary System; (iv) and the ins and outs of EU decision 
making and institution building. A smaller number of contributions dealt with normative 
issues and either discussed monetary integration as a solution to the problem of speculative 
currency trade or admonished Dutch political elites to speed up the process of Dutch welfare 
restructuring in order to be able to comply with the convergence criteria. Critical voices were 
largely absent, reflecting the widespread consensus among Dutch opinion leaders — whatever 
their political hue — that European integration served Dutch interests and was hence a good 
thing.  
 
I took until 7 December 1995 before details about the concrete effects of the actual 
introduction of a single European currency reached the Dutch press. A week before the 
Council Meeting in Madrid where the scenario for the introduction would be determined as 
well as the name of the new currency, the Dutch Society of Banks (‘Nederlandse Vereniging 
van Bankiers’) announced that it expected total costs of the conversion to top 20 billion 
guilders and that it would take three to four years to convert all ATM’s in Europe (120 
thousand) to the new currency. Finally, it argued that the costs of the conversion should not 
be carried by the banks alone but should be distributed fairly between banks, firms and 
private account holders (NRC Handelsblad, 7 December 1995).  
 
From that moment onward, news coverage started to focus on the specifics of European 
monetary integration instead of the larger issues involved. This coincided with the phase 
decision making at the European level had reached. For it took until May 1995 before 
decisions about the actual trajectory of the euro introduction were made. As a result, national 
discussions before that date tended to focus either on the functionality or dysfunctionality of 
monetary integration as such or on the many macro economic uncertainties surrounding the 
European Monetary Union (EMU).  
 
Contrary to experiences in other member states, though, in the Netherlands silence reigned 
supreme before 1995, while afterwards discussions on the specifics predominated over 
fundamentals. As such, further going European monetary integration never was politicized in 
the Netherlands. Reflecting this, the preparation for the introduction of the euro could also 
follow well tried Dutch corporatist, de politicizing strategems. Since the implementation of 
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the paragraphs concerning monetary integration was by and large the responsibility of 
national governments, each of the member states used a distinct institutional framework to 
prepare for the introduction of the euro. In the Netherlands, responsibility for these 
preparations was devolved to the so called National Platform for the Introduction of the Euro 
(in short: the National Platform), established by the Ministry of Finance in February 1996. 
This body was supposed to meet four times a year under the auspices of the Minister of 
Finance and was mandated to inform the Dutch public of the coming changes, to coordinate 
the preparations for the actual introduction and to function as a sounding board for firms, 
interest groups as well as citizens.  
 
What was striking about the National Platform was, first, that it fell under the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Finance rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is normally 
responsible for European issues. This clearly indicates the distinct status that monetary 
issues have in the Dutch polity. The side effect, though, was that its agenda was dominated 
by financial experts who were wary of the input provided by non financial interest 
organizations. The second striking thing is that the National Platform was composed of high
level representatives of an extremely large number of different civil associations. Among the 
participating organizations were ‘usual suspects’ like the three large labor union federations 
(FNV, CNV and MHP), the Dutch employer organization (VNO/NCW), the Central Bank, the 
Dutch Banking Association (NVB) and the Dutch organization for SME’s (MKB Nederland), but 
also interest groups such as the Dutch consumer organization, the Council of Dutch Retailers, 
the Chamber of Pension Funds and Insurers and the Dutch organization for the agricultural 
sector.  
 
Such a broad based representation of societal interests did not so much reflect an 
anticipation of possible societal controversies concerning the introduction of the cash euro, 
but rather the intention to include as many as possible avenues for obtaining information in 
order to ensure effective problem solving. Underlying was the premise that the introduction 
of the euro was a purely technical, logistical operation that was distributively neutral and 
devoid of ideological implications and was hence in no need of political legitimation. 
Moreover, the initiative within the National Platform was clearly on the side of the monetary 
and financial experts, who used the other members of the platform, rather asymmetrically, as 
information providers rather than as co deciding peers. The collaborative approach adopted 
by the Dutch government was also reflected in the main slogan chosen for the introductory 
campaign: ‘The euro is of us all’ (‘De euro is van ons allemaal’).  
 
The third striking property of the platform has to do with the relatively late start of the 
campaign. Large scale campaigning activities did not begin before 1998 when the European 
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Commission (EC) had decided which countries were going to participate and had officially 
given the kick off for the second phase (Mak 2001: 153ff.). According to Mak this was both a 
reflection of the lack of controversy in the Netherlands over monetary policies in general and 
an outcome of a well considered information strategy of the Ministry of Finance aimed at 
presenting Dutch voters with a political ‘fait accompli’ (Mak 2001: 155).  
 
It was only in 1997 that the first signs of a breakdown of the consensus in the Netherlands 
became visible. In the beginning of 1997 there were two high profile public interventions, one 
from the right and one from the left, which finally spawned public debate and could well 
account for the sudden drop in Dutch public support for the euro in the spring of 1997 (see 
Mak 2001: 142). In an interview with the NRC Handelsblad the then leader of the Dutch 
liberal party (and later European Commissionar), Fritz Bolkestein, voiced concerns related to 
the sustainability of the EMU and the effectiveness of the Growth and Stability Pact as a 
guarantor of the macro economic convergence that monetary unification required (NRC 
Handelsblad, 11 February 1997). In this, Bolkestein largely reiterated the orthodoxy among 
monetary experts that had been voiced just a month earlier in the same daily by the American 
economist Lawrence Lindsey (NRC Handelsblad, 22 January 1997). What was typical of this 
intervention for the Dutch position on European monetary integration was that the wisdom 
of the project of integration itself was not in doubt but rather its facilitating conditions. 
Basically, the stance was that other member states would be expected to fail to practice the 
monetary austerity that was the hallmark of Dutch policy making and that was, or ought to 
be, the foundation of European monetary integration too. 
 
This was not the case, though, with the intervention from the left. In a contribution to the left 
wing daily De Volkskrant, a group of 70 heterodox economists voiced complaints against the 
expected socio economic effects of the Growth and Stability Pact as well as against the 
monetarist hue of the European Central Bank, which was seen to preclude the possibility of 
monetary expansion as a means to kick start economies, and called for an extensive debate on 
the pro’s and con’s of the EMU (De Volkskrant, February 13, 1997). As such, this intervention 
had less to do with the specifics of European monetary integration and more with the 
overwhelming dominance within academic economics as well as economic policy making of 
what was explicitly called the ‘monetarist’ orthodoxy. Played out against the monetarist 
mainstream was an expansionist economic policy based on new Keynesian insights (Reuten 
et al. 1998). In other words, this was a dispute about the nature of European monetary 
integration fought out in the domain of economic expertise that, however, failed to 
reverberate with the concerns of the Dutch public. The ‘battle between economic models’ that 
the group of 70 sought to kick start in the Netherlands was largely perceived as untimely 
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within the context of the economic successes of the Dutch ‘poldermodel’ of that time. 
However, it would return, with a vengeance, eight years later. 
 
Despite these flurries of more principled debate over the rationality of European monetary 
integration as such, the larger debate in the Netherlands focused mainly on the technicalities 
of the effects on its hard currency tradition of possible relaxations of the membership criteria. 
Tellingly, in the buildup to the final decision of the European Council on EMU membership in 
1998, there appeared a large number of contributions from high ranking Dutch officials and 
opinion leaders on possible scenario’s for the EMU based on the ability of countries like 
France and Germany to keep their budgets within the EMU range and the possible 
consequences this would have for the Netherlands. That the discussion focused so much on 
other member states was related to the fact that the Dutch economy was doing extremely well 
at the time, allowing the ruling coalition of liberals and social democrats to clean up state 
deficits and focus on job creation. In other words, contingent economic circumstances as well 
as a cast of mind that was the product of a centuries long tradition of free trade that befitted a 
small, open economy, resulted in a more or less society wide acceptance of the monetarist 
mainstream on which the EMU was supposed to be built. The upshot, however, was that 
public support for the euro declined. Between the autumn of 1998 and the spring of 1999, the 
percentage of Dutch respondents that were ‘in favor’ of the euro diminished with ten 
percentage points (Mak 2001: 143). The doubts voiced by Dutch elites about the rationality of 
a monetary union encompassing ‘soft currency’ states clearly fed back into the perceptions of 
the larger public. 
 
2.2 The Introduction of the Euro 
Phase 1: May 1998  December 1998 
The announcement of the European Parliament that it had agreed with the conclusions 
reached by the European Council and the European Monetary Institute that eleven member 
states complied with the criteria of the Growth and Stability Pact and would hence be allowed 
to participate in the euro, marked the start of the first phase of the actual introduction of the 
euro. The participating countries were: Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Luxembourg, Austria, Ireland, Finland and the Netherlands. Only Greece did not comply 
with the criteria at that time, but would be allowed to opt for membership later on. Denmark, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom used their right to opt out of the EMU but held open the 
possibility to join later. To dispel fears on the side of ‘strong currency’ countries like the 
Netherlands and Germany that countries like Belgium and Italy would renege on their 
promises to bring down their public debts substantially, the Dutch Minister of Finance, 
Gerrit Zalm, succeeded in gaining support for his proposal to expedite the application of the 
Growth and Stability Pact with six months.  
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However, in Dutch newspapers this was largely drowned out by Dutch rumpus over the 
horse trading that ensued over the presidency of the European Central Bank. While former 
Dutch Central Bank president Wim Duisenberg was the favorite candidate of 14 of the 15 
member states, the French appeared to be unwilling to accept a Duisenberg appointment. 
Instead, they favored the presidency of Jean Claude Trichet. Since the appointment had to be 
unanimous, a compromise had to be found. After prolonged negotiations it was finally 
decided that Duisenberg would step down half way during his presidency, after which Trichet 
would take over. The uproar was enormous in the Netherlands. Ostensibly because it was in 
clear breach of the Treaty requirements, which stipulated that the term was eight years and 
that a successor would be appointed only after the term, had finished in order to ensure 
continuity and political independence. But the subtext was the budding mistrust of a ‘junior 
partner’ vis à vis the larger member states, especially France and Germany. This was 
reflected by comments made by Prime Minister Wim Kok for Dutch television, when he 
stated that most had been made of a win or lose situation — ‘It was either four years of a 
Duisenberg presidency or no presidency at all’ —, while referring to the failed attempts of the 
last couple of years to get prominent Dutch politicians appointed on high profile supra
national positions in order to make the compromise over Duisenberg stand out as a victory. 
 
It was decided that January 1999 would mark the second phase of the official launch of the 
euro. This phase would entail the introduction of the cashless euro and implied that banks 
and firms would have to reconstruct their financial administrations upon the euro as the unit 
of account. For as from January 1999 onward, all national and international cashless 
settlements within the realm of the euro 11 as well as between the euro realm and the outside 
world would have to be conducted in euros. On top of that, banks were obliged to inform 
their private clients of the value of their transactions and accounts in both euro and national 
currency terms. It is obvious that such an operation entailed substantial costs. As such, it 
comes as no surprise that with the approaching of the actual euro introduction an upsurge 
can be observed in the number of news reports on distributive issues. In the same month that 
the Dutch Minister of Finance was able to announce that the flipside of the euro coins would 
continue to carry the portrait of the Dutch queen, there was a row within the National 
Platform between the banks and SME representatives over the distribution of costs. 
Complaining about arrogance and pushiness on the side of the banks, the SME representative 
claimed both a longer conversion period for the introduction of the cash euro in January 
2002 and more generous compensation from the state for the financial burdens his members 
were to shoulder. Similar concerns were voiced by the representative of the Dutch consumer 
organization. She too perceived the National Platform as being dominated by the interests of 
the large financial players (Mak 2001: 154), which in the Dutch context have always served a 
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public function in terms of providing fiscal information to the Dutch tax authorities and by 
closely cooperating with the Dutch monetary authority as a reflection of a shared 
responsibility for the efficiency and stability of the Dutch financial infrastructure. This could 
well explain why newcomers to the domain of monetary issues like the SME organization or 
the Dutch consumer organization, who were merely there to provide information about 
possible bottlenecks and were largely left out of the actual decision making, felt marginalized. 
 
Phase 2.: 1998 – 31 December 2001 
The conversion rate of the Guilder against the euro and hence the value of all guilder
denominated holdings vis à vis the holdings denominated in the other participating 
currencies, was determined by the guilder value of the European Currency Unit (ECU) at the 
closing of the markets on 31 December 1998 and was put at the unwieldy figure of guilder 
2,20371 per euro. While at that time perceived as a mere technicality, in May 2005, just 
before the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty was to take place, a high official of the 
Dutch Central Bank suggested that the actual conversion rate did undervalue the guilder and 
hence might have resulted in a higher level of price inflation in the immediate aftermath of 
the introduction of the cash euro, creating a major row which fed into the discontent that led 
to the Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. I will discuss that episode in more detail 
below. 
 
Moreover, Eurobarometer data show that the conversion rate mattered in a psychological 
sense too. In Germany, Finland, Belgium and Luxembourg, multiplication of existing prices 
with a single digit sufficed to generate an accurate approximation of the euro value, without 
having to conduct any ‘vicious’ rounding up. Because of that, it was relatively easy for 
consumers to converse actual prices in euro prices, providing a sort of ‘natural’ control on the 
pricing policies of retailers and wholesalers. This was not the case in countries were the 
conversion rate required a more elaborate multiplication, as was the case in the Netherlands, 
Austria, France and Greece, where the conversion rate required a much more complex 
calculation (Eurobarometer, May 2002). Because of that complexity there appears to have 
been less of a ‘natural’ consumer control over the process of price conversion than in other 
countries. Moreover, especially in Greece and the Netherlands, the conversion rate was such 
that the calculation technique most easy to memorize (in the Dutch case: multiplying by two 
and adding 10 percent) resulted in a (slight) underestimation of the real costs and hence in a 
‘money illusion’. Apart from the opportunity of abuse the resulting temporary price 
opaqueness might have given some retailers, in some cases, most notably Greece and the 
Netherlands, the actual conversion rate and the mnemonic techniques used by its citizens 




The actual start of the European Monetary Union went smoothly, resulting in triumphalist 
news reports and commentaries in Dutch newspapers. The introduction of the cashless euro 
was heralded as the first step to political unification, while the euro itself was predicted to 
become a main competitor for the US dollar as the international store of value (NRC 
Handelsblad, 4 January 1999). Moreover, news reports announced that the international 
financial markets had rewarded the introduction with a rise of the euro against the dollar, 
while the stock exchanges too had responded positively. Indeed, in the first couple of weeks 
of 1999 all the macro economic promises and expectations regarding the international 
financial status of the euro seemed to become true. Optimism reigned supreme, as was 
indicated by the request of the Belgium Minister of Finance to accelerate the introduction of 
the cash euro with several months because European consumers seemed to accept the euro 
more readily than expected. 
 
However, this optimism rapidly waned when the euro started to slip against the dollar. As 
soon as March 1999, two months after the introduction, news reports began to appear in the 
Dutch press about the fears of higher inflation and hence higher costs of money caused by the 
declining exchange rate of the euro against the dollar. According to commentaries this was 
caused by a rapidly widening divergence of the growth trajectories of the American and 
European economies. Whereas the US booked bumper growth figures, the economic 
performance of the European Union remained subdued because of continuing economic 
troubles in its largest economy, Germany. The exchange rate effects of this divergence were 
further exacerbated by continuing calls from the new German Minister of Finance, the 
socialist ‘radical’ Oskar Lafontaine, on the European central bank to lower its interest rates in 
order to make capital cheaper, enhance investment and speed up economic growth.  
 
In the Netherlands in particular these calls were regarded with suspicion, raising worries on 
the side of Dutch elites that in the Europe wide contest over the nature of the EMU the Dutch 
‘hard currency’ point of view would become marginalized now that the Germans were 
apparently willing to abandon it. Telling is the quote of one of the four German economists 
who challenged the constitutionality of the German ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht 
before the German Supreme Court in an article of the NRC Handelsblad of November 1998 
that ‘the Netherlands is becoming isolated in the European Union with its hard currency 
policy’ (NRC Handelsblad, 4 November 1998). Large was the relief of the Dutch establishment 
when Lafontaine resigned in the spring of 1999, indicating that the battle over the EMU 
between the ‘monetarists’ and the ‘new Keynesians’ was, at least for the moment, decided in 
favor of the former. 
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This type of reporting dominated the Second Stage. Increasingly the link was made between 
the declining value of the euro vis à vis the dollar and the highly political nature of the 
macro economic fundamentals as laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact. Telling in this 
regard was a contribution by Balkenende (the later Prime Minister) and De Koning in the 
NRC Handelsblad of August 27, 1999, which summoned the Dutch government to keep their 
colleagues to the membership criteria as agreed upon in the Dublin agreement and be more 
strict with regard to future transgressions. The summon ended with a forceful: ‘The task of 
Dutch EMU diplomacy should hence be: Watch Dutch and European interests!’ 
 
The tone of voice of this contribution was characteristic of the stance of the Dutch concerning 
the fate of the euro and the EMU. Since the Dutch economy continued to outperform its 
neighbors and the Dutch government had hence no trouble reducing its budget deficit and its 
public debt to the level required by the Growth and Stability Pact, the Dutch government 
became increasingly isolated in the European arena where even the Germans were willing to 
soften the criteria in order to gain more leeway in coping with the growing costs of German 
reunification and were hence increasingly inclined to grant traditional ‘soft currency’ 
countries similar freedoms. While formally the Dutch government presented itself as the last 
remaining guardian of monetarist purity, partly to accommodate the ‘hard currency’ image 
with which the EMU was sold to the Dutch public, in practice its standpoint was more 
ambiguous than that. First, because, as a small and open economy that is increasingly 
dependent on rising exports to the US for its economic well being, the loss of value of the euro 
against the dollar was a clear short term boon even though it’s long term costs because of 
higher inflation and other price disturbances might ultimately be much larger. And second, 
because within the European arena Prime Minister Wim Kok and Minister of Finance Gerrit 
Zalm were forced to grant some of the wishes of their colleagues if they wanted to realize at 
least some of the Dutch’s. The free mandate and ex post accountability mode in which Dutch 
delegates to the European Council operated, resulted in a gradual drift of the coalition 
partners concerning the non negotiability of the criteria of the Growth and Stability Pact and 
a growing rift between the governing parties and the opposition. It is of this internal rift of 
which Balkenende and De Koning’s contribution attested. 
 
Halfway through the second phase, in May 2000, when the euro had lost about a quarter of 
its introductory value against the dollar, Dutch citizens remained largely disaffected by the 
wider political turmoil over the declining value of the euro. Eurobarometer polls suggested 
that the Dutch public was well informed and that Dutch society was well prepared for the 
actual introduction of the cash euro in 2002 (Eurobarometer, July 2001). However, at the 
same time the lack of enthusiasm for the euro was a cause of worry. A representative from the 
NIBUD, a public advisory council for household budgeting, stated that the Dutch consumer 
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was at best indifferent to the euro. The fact that the NIBUD received no requests for 
information on the euro from the public was typical of a widespread indifference, according 
to this spokesperson, and reflected the late and tame start of the Dutch information 
campaign. Countries like Belgium, France, Portugal and Spain had started much earlier. A 
spokesman for the Dutch SME organization noted that his constituents had become slightly 
wary of the euro. The Dutch consumer organization too claimed that consumers were largely 
indifferent to the disappearance of the guilder and its imminent replacement by the euro 
(NRC Handelsblad, 1 May 2000). 
 
Late 2000, when the fall of the euro against the dollar was finally halted, public discussion 
increasingly focused on the more quotidian aspects of the introduction of the cash euro. The 
scenario’s leading up to the introduction gradually gained detail and precision. In May 2000 
the National Platform announced that government and employer organizations had reached 
a covenant that obliged retailers to double price their products from July 1, 2001 onward up 
until the actual introduction of the physical euro in 2002, much later than in Germany. After 
that, dual pricing was no longer obligatory, a fateful decision, as it turned out to be (see 
below).  
 
Typically Dutch too was the distribution of responsibilities for controlling whether or not 
firms and organizations abused the introduction of the cash euro and the temporary price 
opaqueness it entailed to increase consumer prices. While this danger was clearly recognized 
at an early stage of the introduction campaign, experts downplayed its probability because of 
the rationality of the consumer and the downward effects of competition, which was 
supposed to be enhanced by market integration and the Europe wide transparency that the 
euro introduced. In fact, the idea that the introduction of the euro could result in price rises 
went against the grain of the main economic rationale for its introduction in the first place. 
Price rises would at worst be a short term effect only and would be more than offset in the 
long run by price decreases. Moreover, the instrument of a state imposed ‘price stop’ was 
deemed to be unsuitable and too heavy handed. Instead, the Dutch consumer organization 
was asked to publicly name and shame firms and organizations that abused the introduction 
of the euro to increase consumer prices. To that end, the Dutch consumer organization 
announced in April 2001 the establishment of a so called ‘euromonitor’ (‘Euromeldpunt’), 
where consumers could report illegitimate price increases (NRC Handelsblad, 26 April 2001). 
On the basis of this information, the Consumer organization would list the names of the firms 
conducting abusive price policies on its website, in the hope that consumers would punish 
these firms by shifting their purchases to other companies, forcing these firms to adjust their 
prices downward. In other words, price control was left to a private organization, which had 
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only ‘soft’ mechanisms at its disposal to rectify economic agents and was dependent on 
consumers for its information.  
 
The other issue that dominated news reports at this stage was the distribution of the costs of 
the conversion to the euro over the different parties involved. The Minister of Finance, in 
turn, announced in June 2000 that all Dutch resident would receive a congratulatory set of 
euro coins, the so called ‘Eurokit’, with a value of euro 3,88 right before the actual 
introduction in order to make the Dutch public acquainted with the new coins. The total costs 
of this gift were estimated at 120 million guilders, which made the Dutch campaign for the 
introduction of the euro one of the most expensive of all member states (Mak 2001). 
Moreover, because it implied a distribution of total costs between the EU and the Dutch 
government in which most was borne by the latter, the responsibility for the euro campaign 
too was largely born by the Dutch government, implying a more or less complete 
marginalization of EU agencies in the Dutch realm. Striking too was the absence of linkages 
between the national organizations represented in the platform and their European level 
counterparts. The result was a strict divorce between the European side of the euro 
introduction and the Dutch side of it. Since the presence of Dutch agents in the European 
policy arena was largely invisible to the Dutch public at large while European agents were 
physically largely absent in the Dutch political realm, Dutch citizens could gain the 
impression that that their representatives were mainly indifferent executioners of European 
decisions, which were, moreover, increasingly perceived as exogenous commands (Mak 2001: 
162ff.).  
 
The total costs of the euro conversion were estimated at 7,5 billion guilders, approximately 1 
per cent of Dutch GDP. The largest part of this was born by the private sector. In particular, 
business services and SME’s (which partly overlap) were presented with huge conversion 
costs. Most of these costs were caused by the necessary adaptations of accounting, payment 
and pricing systems. In fact, retailers effectively functioned as delegated distributors of the 
new euro. The Dutch banks also bore large costs in the magnitude of 1,4 billion guilders. Most 
of that, however, had already been spend in the aftermath of the virtual conversion to the 
euro in 1999, when the Dutch payment system had been converted to the euro as its unit of 
account. According to the Dutch central bank, the new euro proof payment system had 
already become profitable for the Dutch banks, since they no longer had to bear the costs of 
exchange rates fluctuations, while they could still charge their customers for cross border 
transactions. The remaining 1,5 billion was at the expense of the Dutch government and 
represented the costs of the production, storage and distribution of the coins and bills, the 
collecting of the replaced guilders, as well as the costs of informing the Dutch public by 
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means of advertisements, lectures, websites, commercials, brochures and the Eurokit (NRC 
Handelsblad, 1 November 2001) 
 
As the start of the Third Stage came nearer and logistic planning become more detailed, the 
news reports too became increasingly practical. They focused on possible transaction delays 
because of conversion problems at counters and box offices; they described how the actual 
distribution was being organized by the Bureau Euro Conversion, which was set up by the 
Dutch central bank to keep oversight over the logistical operation; they mentioned the 
different agencies that were going to be used in different member states to distribute the euro 
over the different points of issuance: the Bundeswehr in Germany, the army, navy and air 
force in France, and the privatized mail service in the Netherlands. The overall tone of the 
reporting at this period was slightly self congratulatory. Interviewees of the Dutch 
government and the Dutch central bank emphasized their pride over the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the conversion process, which would be the quickest and best organized of 
the entire EMU. Indicative was the decision to start distributing the euro only in December 
and limit the so called dual period, during which both guilders and euros would be the 
accepted means of payment, to four weeks only: from January 1, 2002 to January 28, while 
most members states started as soon as September and took six to eight weeks to finish the 
conversion process. 
 
Phase 3.: 1 January 2001 – 31 January 2001 
It was a demonstration of Dutch logistical genius that everything went according to plan. The 
64 (!) emergency scenario’s that the Dutch Ministry of Finance had at its disposal in order to 
anticipate all possible contingencies, turned out to be just so many fantasies. In the NRC 
Handelsblad, the Minister of Finance, Gerrit Zalm, was quoted as stating that the actual 
conversion had proceeded according to ‘the ideal scenario’ (NRC Handelsblad, 2 January 
2002). In many bars and disco’s new years night was proclaimed to be ‘guilder night’ only, in 
order to keep transaction times as low as possible. Others had installed a ‘point of exchange’ 
near the entrance, where visitors could exchange their guilders for euros. And some firms had 
opted for a voucher system. Commentaries in the national newspapers heralded the new coin 
as a marker of a next phase in European integration with momentous effects for Dutch 
society and the Dutch economy.  
 
While the second half of 2001 was largely dedicated to the practical consequences of the 
introduction euro, in the first weeks of 2002 the emphasis was once again on the larger issues 
which economic and monetary integration raised. For instance, Mark Kranenburg, political 
commentator of the NRC Handelsblad, proclaimed that the introduction of the euro in fact 
announced the end of the Netherlands, stating that Dutch politicians had only stressed the 
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economic advantages of monetary integration and had failed to elucidate its political 
repercussions, raising the question whether the Dutch political elite had done so on purpose 
or whether it was a measure of its naivety. He concluded with the statement that the answer 
was immaterial since the monetary integration of Europe had set in motion a logic that would 
ultimately result in more political integration (NRC Handelsblad, 4 January 2002). However, 
this philosophical intermezzo in the mostly practical nature of Dutch public discourse on 
European integration proved to be short lived. 
 
2.3 The Aftermath 
The self congratulatory tone of the second half of 2001 rapidly turned sour in the first half of 
2002. As early as January 31, a caption in the NRC Handelsblad read: ‘Dutch consumer 
organization raises its subscription prices’, an event that would probably had passed 
unnoticed if it had not been the very same organization that was publicly mandated to keep 
firms in line by publicizing the names of firms that used the introduction of the euro to raise 
to prices (NRC Handelsblad, 31 January 2002). As a result the neutral status of the Consumer 
organization was lost, while the list it published became highly politicized. A number of firms 
that were listed contested their listing successfully, forcing the Consumer organization to 
further investigate the consumers claims; a requirement for which it lacked both expertise 
and means. Only a year after its establishment, and three months after the introduction of the 
euro, the Euromonitor was closed down because of increasing controversy over its listings 
and lack of price reducing effects. 
 
A couple of days later, the NRC Handelsblad reported new consumer price inflation figures, 
which made it clear that, contrary to expectations, inflation had not fallen back from its level 
of 4,5 per cent over 2001, but had remained at 4 per cent, between one and 1,5 per cent 
higher than in the EU as a whole. How come, the newspaper asked, and answered that it was 
caused by macro economic overheating which was seen as the price one had to pay for the 
Dutch economic successes of the past seven years (NRC Handelsblad, 9 February 2002). A 
week later again, the paper reported that the introduction of the euro had not resulted in a 
convergence of European consumer prices but rather had made visible the price effects of 
different national tax regimes (NRC Handelsblad, 14 February 2002). In April, the paper 
reported that an increasing number of members of parliament were worried about the 
inflationary effects of the euro introduction and called for a public investigation (NRC 
Handelsblad, 25 April 2002). While initially functionaries of the Dutch Central Bank rejected 
claims of euro related price rises as being unfounded, in June they had to admit that the 
introduction of the euro could have added 0,2 to 0,4 per cent to overall inflation. Price rises 
were especially significant in the hotel and restaurant trades, in the DVD and CD retail 
business, but municipal parking tariffs and local taxes too had been raised during the euro 
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conversion (DNB 2002). The request from the Consumer organization to impose price stops 
in these branches was brushed aside as being incompatible with a free market economy by 
the Minister of Finance.  
 
While real inflation rates have since these first tumultuous months slowly returned to 
European averages, Dutch citizens have remained distrustful of the euro. One year after the 
introduction of the euro, polls showed that of all citizens the Dutch felt most strongly that the 
introduction of the euro had been to the detriment of the consumer; 94 percent thought so 
against a EU average of 84. This corresponds with a large share of Dutch citizens being 
skeptical about the claim that the euro contributed to price stability. Only 28 percent of the 
Dutch did think that the euro helped stabilize prices, against 34 for the EU as a whole (Flash 
EB 139). 
 
A year later (two years after the introduction of the euro) the picture was more or less the 
same. Together with citizens from Germany and Greece, Dutch citizens were most skeptical 
about the statement that the introduction of the euro contributed to price stability. 53 
percent of Dutch citizens denied that, compared to 60 percent in Germany and 54 percent in 
Greece. The EU average was 48 per cent. Dutch citizens were also most outspoken on whether 
or not the euro had been advantageous. A stunning 46 percent found that not to have been 
the case, a figure that was only topped by German citizens, and was well above the EU average 
of 36 percent (Flash EB 153). Even in 2005, four years after the formal introduction of the 
cash euro, Dutch citizens still ranked last in the percentage of interviewees that answered 
affirmative to the statement that the introduction of the euro had been advantageous overall. 
Only 38 percent thought so, while the EU average was 51 (Flash EB 175). Meanwhile, real 
inflation rates in the Netherlands had declined steadily from 3.3 percent in 2003 to 1,2 





Compared with an average annual inflation rate of 2.1 in the Euro zone, Dutch citizens 
ostensibly had no reason to keep insisting that the euro had contributed to inflation. Yet they 
did, raising the question to what extent their rejection of the Constitutional Treaty was 
influenced by their persisting mistrust over the euro conversion. 
 
While the post referendum poll of Eurobarometer does not list discontent over the price 
enhancing effects of the euro as a reason for rejecting the Constitutional Treaty (instead most 
interviewees mentioned ‘lack of information’ (32%), ‘loss of national sovereignty’ (19%) and 
resentment towards the political elite (14%) as their main reasons for rejecting the treaty) 
(Flash EB 172), it has to be taken into account that the questionnaire did not contain a clause 
on the euro and hence does not prove that the euro did not play a role in the rejection. 
Besides, Dutch poll data collected in the context of the Dutch National Election Study 
(‘Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek’) tell a different story. In fact, 73 percent of those who voted 
against the treaty strongly agreed with the statement that the euro conversion had had 
seriously harmed Dutch interests. Similarly, 64 percent of ‘no’ voters agreed strongly with 
the statement that the introduction of the cash euro had resulted in price hikes. In other 
words, there appear to be strong correlations between the stance toward the euro and the 
actual voting behavior at the referendum (see Van der Kolk & Aarts 2005: 197ff.). Hence NRC 
Handelsblad seems justified in calling the Dutch referendum on the Constitutional Treaty a 
covert judgment on the wisdom of the introduction of the euro four years earlier, even though 
treaty and euro were technically unrelated (NRC Handelsblad, 19 May 2005).  
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3 HOW TO EXPLAIN THE RIDDLE OF BELATED CONTESTATION? 
As the preceding reconstruction makes clear, the riddle of belated contestation consists in 
fact of a number of riddles, which are all, in their own way, related to the perceived price rises 
that the introduction of the cash euro presumably has caused. The first question that needs to 
be answered in this regard is: 
 
Did the introduction of the cash euro contribute to consumer price inflation, and if so, to 
what extent? 
When the increasing public discontent over perceived price rises after the euro conversion 
reached parliament in mid 2002, the government asked the Central Planning Bureau (CPB), 
its main economic advisor, to identify the contribution of the introduction of the cash euro to 
the persistently high inflation rates in the Netherlands. The focus was in particular on price 
rises in the hotel and restaurant trade, which received the most abuse from disgruntled 
consumers. The CPB concluded that price rises in this particular trade indeed surpassed the 
average inflation rate over the first eight months of 2002 of 3.6 percent with on average 3.6 
percentage points. However, only part of that excessive inflation was euro related. Much 
more important were attempts to repair overall profitability, which had taken huge hits in 
2000 and 2001 because rising wages and increasing competition. Moreover, the excessive 
price rises in the hotel and restaurant trade contributed only 0.3 percent to the overall 
consumer price index. The high inflation in 2001 and 2002 had more to do, according to the 
CPB, with an unfortunate confluence of causes — VAT increases in 2001, starting to bite in 
2002, which were part of the political compromise over the new tax system that was 
introduced in 2001; high vegetable and fruit prices as a result of bad weather; high meat 
prices because of the FMD epidemic in 2001; high energy prices; and especially increasing 
labor costs as a result of macro economic overheating — than with the introduction of the 
euro as such (CPB 2002). In fact, to assess empirically the public claims of increased inflation 
because of the euro, the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) conducted a unique survey in mid 2002 
and asked 6000 retailers, cafes and restaurants to quantify the costs of the introduction of 
the cash euro and how these had affected their prices. On the basis of this information, the 
DNB calculated that the contribution of the conversion to the cash euro to overall inflation 
could not have surpassed 0.6 percent and was probably between 0.2 and 0.4 percent (DNB 
2002). 
 
Nevertheless, Dutch consumers continued to experience a much higher inflation rate and 
kept accusing the euro for being the main culprit. The Central Bureau of Statistics which 
keeps track of both experienced inflation and real inflation, noted in mid 2002 that 
experienced inflation, which used to be at a lower level than real inflation, had in fact jumped 
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the real inflation line shortly after the introduction of the cash euro, while the real inflation 




This of courses raises another, second, question, namely: 
 
If the actual extra inflation caused by the introduction of the cash euro was in reality 
limited, why did Dutch voters overestimate its effects? 
There are different factors that could have added to the Dutch ‘inflation illusion’. There was 
first of all the unfortunate coincidence of a reversal in the Dutch business cycle and the 
introduction of the euro. While the Dutch outperformed most European economies between 
1995 and 2000, 2001 saw a gradual reversal of economic fates. In fact, 2002 initiated a 
period of approximately four years during which the Dutch economy underperformed vis à
vis its European neighbors. While the boom largely explains, as we saw above, the above 
average inflation figures, the following bust could well have contributed to the Dutch 
‘inflation illusion’. After the introduction of the euro, the average Dutch citizen actually lost 
spending power. However, this loss was not so much due to the introduction of the euro, but 
rather to a rapidly worsening economic performance. 
 
Another possible contributing factor could have been public disappointment over the euro 
because of an initial failure to deliver on the promises that were made on its behalf by its 
proponents. In the second half of the 1990s a number of strong claims were made regarding 
the introduction of a single currency, which were used to ‘sell’ the euro to a largely 
disinterested public. It was claimed, first, that the euro would enhance Europe’s monetary 
power vis à vis the US; second, that it would create a Europe wide transparent market for 
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producer and consumer goods and would hence result in more competition and thus lower 
prices; and, third, that it would reduce the costs of border crossing transactions, both for 
households and firms.  
 
In the first months of 2002, the NRC Handelsblad devoted quite a number of pages to the ups 
and downs of the euro versus the dollar. In fact, in the first year of its existence the euro lost 
20 percent of its value against the dollar. Only in May 2003 had the euro rebounded so much 
that it had again reached its introduction rate. Since then, it has gained almost 30 percent 
against the dollar. However, reporting generally is asymmetrical in the amount of copy it 
spends on good or bad news, dedicating much more space on ‘bad news’ than on ‘good news’. 
Hence, the impact of the 20 percent loss on public perceptions could well have been much 
larger than the subsequent 30 percent gain.  
 
The reporting on the problems of some participating states, notably Italy, Greece, France and 
Germany, in keeping the macro economic promises that under girded the monetary union, 
on the persistence of price differences between economies, on the fact that banks — despite 
promises to the contrary — still charged their customers for cross border transactions, as 
well as on the economic gloom in the euro countries after 2002 could well have fed into a 
widely shared ‘feeling’ of the general public that they had been fooled by the political elite 
into accepting a bargain that turned out to be a blank.  
 
Finally, it could well be that the introduction of the euro was perceived by the general public 
as being part of a larger neoliberal agenda in which the project of European integration was 
reduced to ‘negative integration’ or ‘market making’ (Scharpf 1999) and was used by the 
Dutch political elite to enact a policy of welfare retrenchment without having to take 
responsibility for it. While clearly resonating with the 1997 attempt of a group of Dutch 
heterodox economists to politicize the economic underpinnings of the European Monetary 
Union, the reconstruction showed that the attempt failed because of widespread consensus 
about the beneficial nature of a monetarist economic stance for Dutch interests. The 
outstanding property of Dutch monetary policymaking is its fundamentally apolitical nature. 
Since 1983 the Dutch Central Bank had linked its monetary policy to that of the German 
Bundesbank (Szasz 2001: 239ff.). The fixed exchange rate of the guilder to the D mark meant 
that Dutch monetary parameters were actually decided in Frankfurt. Moreover, the dollar
guilder value was determined by the dollar D mark value, implying that the Dutch central 
bank only had to coordinate its market interventions closely with those of the Bundesbank. 
Because, in monetary terms, the Netherlands was a province of the German Federal 
Republic, the loss of sovereignty implied by European monetary integration was hardly of 
practical salience. The fact that it was lacking political salience indicates a rather pragmatic 
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stance of the Dutch public to monetary issues. Moreover, as a small and open economy that is 
largely dependent for its economic well being on international trade (Katzenstein 1985), 
Dutch elites as well as the public at large were well aware of the importance of a hard 
currency, suggesting that the monetarist stance of both Bundesbank and Dutch Central Bank 
were perceived as being both macro economically sound and politically and ideologically 
neutral. Hence, the fears Dutch elites and the people at large harbored over European 
monetary integration were the same as those of the Germans and the reverse of those 
cherished by the French and other ‘soft’ currency states and concerned the future ‘softness’ of 
the euro rather than the loss of monetary sovereignty. 
 
The question is why this consensus broke down. While no hard empirical data on this issue 
exist, a plausible explanation would have to include the very different economic 
circumstances of the early 2000s. The importance of having access to relatively generous 
social security arrangements is of course much larger, and is hence more prominent in the 
perception of citizens, in the case of a recession. This could well explain why the small 
Socialist Party (SP) that played a disproportionally important role in the 2005 campaign 
against the Constitutional Treaty, succeeded in framing the Treaty as a neoliberal 
constitution that would erode the Dutch welfare state and why the group of heterodox 
economists failed in 1997, the high tide of the success story of the Dutch ‘poldermodel’. 
 
While Dutch poll data suggest that these issues did indeed play a role in the voting behavior 
of Dutch citizens in the 2005 referendum — 83 percent of those who did vote against the 
treaty expected that European integration would result in the erosion of the Dutch welfare 
state, while 71 percent of no voters strongly rejected the claim that European integration 
would enhance their welfare (Van der Kolk & Aarts 2005: 192) — the disadvantage of these 
explanations is that they are ultimately based on the irrationality of the voter. The 
effectiveness of ‘framing’ by political entrepreneurs such as the SP is dependent on the 
inability of voters to distinguish between different issues. Although it might well be that the 
average voter is unable to keep the different issues distinct and to understand that there are 
in fact only weak causal links between these issues and the introduction of the cash euro, the 
presumption of rationality that is underlying most social theorizing requires the 
consideration of more fine grained explanations. 
 
The earlier reconstruction showed that such an explanation could well be related to the 
specifics of the introduction of the cash euro, and especially its conversion rate. The new field 
of ‘behavioral finance’ increasingly emphasizes the importance of taking into account the 
cognitive limits of the human mind in order to understand the behavior of economic agents. 
Under conditions of complexity or time pressure, human decision making is triggered by 
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emotions and follows rules of thumb instead of careful weighing costs and benefits. As a 
result, decision making generally doesn’t result in optimal decisions but in ‘satisficing’ 
decisions (Prast 2004). In fact, a number of studies have used these insights to explain why 
the ‘inflation illusion’ caused by the cash euro is more prevalent in some countries than in 
others. When the conversion rate is both difficult and results in underestimations one would 
expect agents to experience stronger ‘inflation illusion’ than in cases were only one of these 
variables is present. While there were several countries in which the conversion rate was 
perceived to be difficult (Austria, France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain) or resulted 
in underestimations (Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain), only in Greece 
and the Netherlands were the conversion rates both difficult and inflationary. Whereas 
difficult but overestimating rates do generate financial opaqueness but an opaqueness that 
does not matter much because they overestimate prices and hence lead to ‘deflationary 
illusions’, underestimating but simple rates allow consumers to quickly correct their 
estimations and hence to dispel ‘inflation illusions’. In the case of both difficult and 
underestimating rates that is not possible. Hence, it is not surprising that both Greece and 
the Netherlands are the countries where the mismatch between real and perceived inflation is 
not only highest but also most persistent (Traut Mattausch et al. 2004; Ehrmann 2006). This 
raises the question what Dutch policy makers could have done to dispel the ‘inflation 
illusion’, a question I return to below. 
 
Finally, since the event of the introduction of the cash euro was not only technically unrelated 
to the Constitutional Treaty but was also separated from it in time, the question is: 
 
How and why was the euro ‘linked’ to the treaty? 
Part of the answer is of course related to the ‘framing’ mentioned above. Because of an 
unfortunate confluence of causes — economic decline, ‘inflation illusion’, disappointed 
expectations — there clearly was a window of opportunity for political entrepreneurs to frame 
the treaty as a formalization of the neoliberal project that was perceived to have brought 
economic decline, loss of purchasing power because of the introduction of the euro, and 
welfare state retrenchment. According to Eurobarometer data as late as 2005 Dutch 
interviewees were most negative about the euro. Only 38 percent held the opinion that the 
introduction of the euro had been advantageous, versus 51 percent for the euro 12 overall. 
However, after four years the ‘inflation illusion’ seemed to have worn of a little. The 93 
percent of Dutch interviewees that thought the euro had caused inflation was exactly the 
Euro 12 average (Flash EB 175). This suggests that it is not self evident that the euro would 
have played such a large role in the 2005 referendum and hence that Dutch voters could just 
as well have rejected the ‘frame’ adopted by the SP. In other words, a more direct linkage in 
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time was needed to reinvigorate the Dutch ‘collective memory’ of the inflation caused by the 
cash euro in order to explain the impact of the ‘inflation illusion’ on the 2005 referendum. 
 
Fatefully, such a linkage was provided by a public row, just a month before the referendum, 
over the height of the rate against which the guilder was converted to the euro in 1998, 
following an interview of a high ranking Dutch Central Bank official, Henk Brouwer, with the 
Amsterdam based daily, Het Parool. In that interview, the official claimed that the guilder 
had been undervalued against the D mark with 5 to 10 percent, suggesting that the euro 
conversion rate should not have been 2,20371 but rather in the vicinity of 2, a rate that would 
have been similar to the D mark conversion rate and would largely have solved to ‘inflation 
illusion’ problem described above. The interview focused primarily on the effects of the 
undervaluation of the guilder against the D mark, the currency of its largest trading partner, 
namely: above average growth in the late 1990s and above average price inflation in the early 
2000s (Het Parool, 30 April 2005a). However, Het Parool turned this rather technical and 
nuanced account into the sensational story that the euro conversion rate of the guilder had 
been too low, suggesting that the introduction of the cash euro had robbed Dutch consumers 
of their money and that Dutch elites had willingly kept this from the Dutch public. An 
account of this nature was put large on the front page under the caption: ‘Guilder too cheap 
into the Euro; Dutch Central Bank kept undervaluation of guilder secret’ (Het Parool, 
30 April 2005b). This quickly turned into a media hype and within two days reached 
parliament. Gerrit Zalm, the Minister of Finance, was asked to respond to questions from 
several MP’s who claimed that the government should never have kept this secret. Although 
the Minister admitted that the guilder had been undervalued, he stressed that it had been 
largely beneficial, while the post euro inflation was not so much caused by an undervalued 
guilder as by economic policy mistakes of the second ‘purple’ (liberal and social democratic) 
coalition, in which he himself had been Minister of Finance (!). 
 
While being contested by economic experts (see CPB 2005), the sensational message that 
Dutch interests had been sold out by its representatives during the determination of the euro 
conversion rates in mid 1998, found a willing audience among Dutch voters trying to make 
up their minds about the Constitutional Treaty. For the SP, the most active and most 
determined party on the side of the opponents, the huge wave of publicity following the faux
pas of the DNB official and the failed attempts by Dutch government officials at damage 
control, was a gift from heaven. What was still a small victory for the ruling coalition in April 
2005, turned quickly into a large defeat in May. 
 
It is obvious that the Brouwer affaire could never have served as ‘tipping point’ if the populist 
shockwave following the rise and death of Pim Fortuyn would not have resulted in a backlash 
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against ‘policy making by stealth’. In this climate, political capital was gained by candor and 
openness, even though the issues at stake might be better served by caution and a certain 
measure of secrecy. Moreover, the Dutch public clearly distrusted experts and their technical 
vocabularies. As a result, politicians — but opinion leaders, academics and policymakers as 
well — felt increasingly compelled to express themselves in quotidian ways, even though the 
topic required a more sophisticated treatment. This tendency was reinforced by increasing 
competition between and within media over the favors of the viewer and reader. Brouwer 
clearly was a victim of this and as such his role in the Dutch rejection of the Constitutional 
Treaty cannot be treated as a deliberate public intervention by a political entrepreneur with 
clear and well defined political objectives, even though his faux pas was adroitly transformed 
into political capital by agents like Jan Marijnissen en Harry van Bommel of the SP, which 
during the campaign proved themselves as shrewd political entrepreneur.  
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4 COULD CONTESTATION HAVE BEEN AVOIDED?  
If these are indeed the euro related causes behind the Dutch rejection of the Constitutional 
Treaty, how much of it could have been avoided? If the contestation over the euro and its role 
in the rejection of the treaty is merely the result of an unfortunate mix of small, unrelated 
policy mistakes and other coincidences and contingencies, than there is not much that could 
have been done to prevent the rejection. Policy makers would have been largely exonerated 
too if it was caused by the ignorance or even stupidity of the median voter, who failed to see: 
(i) that the euro had nothing to do with the treaty; (ii) that the introduction of the euro was 
only marginally responsible for the 2002 inflation; (iii) that the simultaneity of the 
introduction of the euro and macro economic decline was a mere coincidence; (iv) that the 
euro was not part and parcel of a neoliberal complot; (v) that European integration was not 
limited to market making (Heritier 1999; Hemerijck 2004; Zeitlin & Trubek 2003); and who 
(vi) refused to revise their opinions in the light of expert information and superior 
knowledge. While it is surely true that every politician begets the voter (s)he deserves, if the 
latter fails to listen to the best arguments around there is not much policy makers can do. Or 
to reiterate Gerrit Zalm’s statement: ‘if Dutch voters prefer to listen to Marco Borsato instead 
of informing themselves of the economic advantages of the euro, then there is not much that 
politicians can do’. If, however, the contestation was caused by the fact that the electorate no 
longer bought the ‘framing’ of distributive issues as merely technical, problem solving ones, 
policy makers can either be faulted for practicing policy making by stealth and hence for 
infringing upon democratic precepts, or for failing to see that changes in external conditions 
had actually turned what used to be pure problem solving into an issue with distributive 
consequences. The first fault would clearly be a moral one, whereas the second is merely a 
strategic one. In view of the foregoing it seems that a mixture of the former and the latter is 
applicable here. I start with the category of ‘policy mistakes’. 
 
4.1 Policy Mistakes 
As the reconstruction demonstrated, there were a number of factors that added to the overall 
disgruntlement of the Dutch public over the introduction of the cash euro that clearly could 
have been avoided. A case in point is the Brouwer affaire. Although disappointing from a 
social science perspective, it is clear that the affaire was a contingency that need not have 
taken place. As such it clearly fits into the category of unfortunate coincidences. However, it 
also points to a lack of coordination on the side of Dutch policymakers regarding the 
distribution of tasks and responsibilities in the campaign for the Treaty (see Lucardie 2005). 
That, in turn, indicates a certain laxness on the side of leading members of the coalition that 
could either be due to too much trust in the pro European frame of mind of the Dutch 
electorate or to an underestimation of the adroitness of their political adversaries. Both 
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explanations have a certain plausibility, for, first, Dutch citizens used to be very pro Europe 
while the rise of a more skeptical frame of mind was both relatively recent and gradual, and 
second, because opinion polls indicated that a majority, even if a small one, would vote in 
favor of the Treaty. Defeat came suddenly and accidentally, even though a more providential 
politician might have seen it coming. 
 
A similar picture rises up from the observation that the temporary opaqueness caused by the 
introduction of the cash euro was abused by local authorities to increase the prices citizens 
had to pay for local services. While most of these price increases could be explained by 
upward round offs of the odd prices that resulted from converting guilder prices in euro 
prices, it remains the case that complaints from citizens about the fact that even public 
authorities made unjustified price increases added strongly to the general feeling of inflation 
brought about by the euro conversion. Here too there appeared to be a general lack of 
coordination within the organizations and institutes of the Dutch state that is indicative of a 
similar lack of concern of Dutch policy makers for the public legitimacy of their European 
policy making. This too could easily have been prevented. 
 
The same is suggested by the failure to anticipate the ‘inflation illusion’ on the side of Dutch 
consumers, caused by the unfortunate combination of temporary price opaqueness as a result 
of a particularly hard multiplication and value underestimation as a result of a coincidental 
level of the euro guilder conversion rate. These effects could have been anticipated and 
should have resulted in a more hands on approach by the EU. Instead, because of the limited 
size of the EU contribution to the overall costs of the conversion campaigns, content and 
organization were largely determined by state agents and hence followed national 
organization patterns and national focuses. In the Netherlands, as we have seen, that implied 
both the delegation of price controlling to a civil organization that, as it appeared, ultimately 
lacked to moral authority to do so effectively, and a strong emphasis on a speedy changeover 
rather than dispelling the ‘inflation illusion’. According to Dutch policy makers, speed rather 
than prudence was what mattered, especially in a context of slowly swelling public 
skepticism. Moreover, a speedy introduction and hence a rapid termination of the period of 
dual pricing was explicitly recommended by the EC (Flash EB 175 :24) .  
 
In hindsight, this has proven to be a serious miscalculation. At the level of the EU, policy 
makers should have taken into account studies in behavioral finance and should have pushed 
member states to take adequate measures to lessen the length and deepness of the 
unavoidable period of price opaqueness. In practice, this should have resulted in a 
differentiated price regime in the realm of the Euro 12, in which the mode of price control 
would be determined by the extent of price opaqueness. In countries were the conversion rate 
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was simple and price opaqueness relatively low, the EU could have left the specifics of the 
introduction of the cash euro to the member states. Moreover, in those states there would 
have been no need for obligatory dual pricing since consumers would possess the calculative 
means to control pricing policies on their own account. However, in countries where the rate 
was both complex and resulted in a structural underestimation of euro prices, as was the case 
in the Netherlands and Greece, a more compelling pricing regime could have shortened the 
period of price opaqueness and could hence have diminished the ensuing ‘inflation illusion’. 
This does not automatically imply price controls in the strict sense, though that was the only 
alternative actually discussed (and dismissed) in the Netherlands. Rather, the Dutch 
government should have made dual pricing obligatory and should have taken the 
responsibility for checking against inflationary abuses of price opaqueness upon itself, rather 
than delegating it to an understaffed, under resourced voluntary association. In that way, the 
lingering resentment of the Dutch (and Greek) public against the euro and, by association, 
the Constitutional Treaty could have largely been avoided. Their failure to do so was a 
mistake that, once again, indicates a clear disregard for the actual public perceptions, which 
seems to be born both by the depoliticized nature of monetary policy making in the 
Netherlands and the long shadow of the age of permissiveness that used to characterize the 
opinion of the Dutch public regarding European integration.  
 
4.2 Timing 
All explanations that have to do with ‘timing’ clearly fall in the category of ‘contingencies’ 
(Pierson 2004). As the reconstruction given above demonstrates, ‘timing’ was of the utmost 
importance. It played a role in at least four ways. First, by feeding the slowly rising public 
distrust concerning the euro through the deteriorating exchange rate of the euro against the 
dollar. Since the declining value of the euro reflected the dismal expectations of international 
FX traders concerning the economic prospects of the Euro 12, this was but an unfortunate 
coincidence for which policy makers were hardly responsible and hence could hardly be 
faulted.  
 
Second, ‘timing’ mattered in the sense that the prolonged recession in the euro area — 
consisting of high inflation, slow economic growth and declining spending power — that 
started right after the introduction of the cash euro, became indelibly linked with the 
introduction of the euro in the perception of the general public, even though the two ‘events’ 
had nothing to do with one another. While one can contest the wisdom of pursuing 
deflationary macro economic policies at the onset of a regional recession, as the Dutch 
government did in response to the huge losses suffered by Dutch pension funds on the worlds 
stock exchanges, it is too strong to blame policy makers for the lackluster economic 
performance between 2002 and 2005.  
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Third, ‘timing’ mattered in the sense that the particular moment chosen for the referendum 
on the Constitutional Treaty implied a historical context in which the chance of a backlash 
against the position of the government was larger than normally. While the lack of 
experiences with national referendums in the Netherlands clearly played a role in the 
incompetent handling of it by the coalition partners (see above), experiences in other 
member states show that generally national referendums on European issues fail in times of 
recession and succeed in times of economic growth. The changing mood of the electorate in 
the early 1990s in the two main protagonists of European integration, France and Germany, 
for instance, is largely explained by the mismatch between the economic expectations 
surrounding the Single European Market and the actual economic performance at that time. 
After nearly 15 years of lackluster economic growth, the budding economic and political 
bullishness of the late 1980s, which was both cause and effect of the new impetus to 
European integration, suddenly gave way in 1992 to a short but fierce recession. While largely 
outside the span of control of national politicians, its timing could not have been worse. 
Where voters had a chance, as they did in Denmark and France, they forcefully made it clear 
that the case for European integration was not as uncontested as the political elites hoped it 
was but was instead highly dependent on macro economic performances. 
 
Fourth, ‘timing’ mattered in the sense that the construction of an integrated European 
market as well as the enlargement of the EU had gradually diminished the position of the 
Netherlands within the EU. Up until, say, 1985, when there was still an impasse in the 
German French relationship, the Dutch were able, by acting as an intermediating power 
broker, to wield undue influence over EU decision making, especially in view of its small size. 
Because of that, parliamentary control over Dutch European standpoints hardly seemed to 
matter. Since there were large side payments anyway, especially in the form of agrarian 
subsidies, Dutch interests were actually furthered by European integration. As a result there 
were no incentives for opposition parties to politicize EU issues. This slowly changed from 
1985 onward when France and Germany did succeed, because of reasons that fall outside the 
scope of this paper to discuss (but see Dyson & Featherstone 1999; Eichengreen 1997; 
Moravscik 1998; Szasz 2001), in overcoming their decades long battle over the extent and 
nature of European integration, and hence did no longer have to ‘bribe’ Dutch 
representatives to back their respective positions. As a result, Dutch influence waned and the 
beneficial nature of European integration for Dutch interests became less self evident. 
Hence, European issues started to attract more, if negative, political attention. The Dutch 
uproar over the failure to get Dutch officials nominated for high profile European positions 
that came to a peak with the horse trading over the nomination of Wim Duisenberg as 
president of the ECB, clearly must be seen in this light. But so must the shrill public 
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discussion over Dutch contributions to the EU, which strongly emphasized that the Dutch had 
become the biggest net contributors while skipping over the fact that before 1995 they had 
been one of Europe’s largest net receivers. And so must the feelings of outrage and isolation 
that were experienced by the Dutch when the Germans started to backpedal upon their 
earlier commitments to the monetarist designs of European monetary integration, as they 
were embodied in the criteria of the Growth and Stability Pact.  
 
While these are all matters of ‘timing’ and hence fall outside the category of blamable or 
praiseworthy actions, they do seem to contain lessons for political agents to prevent future 
backlashes. First, of course, that ‘timing’ matters and hence that political agents should be 
clear about the windows of opportunities different contexts, especially economic ones, 
provide for different interests. While, following Macchiavelli, good policy making is a matter 
of virtu as well fortuna, Macchiavelli strongly emphasized that the ability to take advantage 
of fortunate circumstances is part and parcel of being a virtuous politician (Macchiavelli 
1988). In that regard, it is obvious that Jan Marijnissen and Harry van Bommel of the SP 
were better ‘statesmen’ than the members of the ruling coalition. 
 
Second, that the output based legitimacy of European decision making can no longer be 
taken for granted, and now less than ever. Because of increasing complexity and 
interdependence it becomes ever harder to trace social outcomes to political outputs. As a 
result, political decisions can get blamed for results that have no causal link to the decisions 
in question. That seems clearly to have happened here, for Dutch voters blamed the decision 
to changeover to the euro for the bad economic weather that ensued upon its introduction, 
even though both events were technically unrelated. Because the linkages between the 
different scales of governance are becoming stronger, input based forms of legitimacy can be 
expected to become increasingly important. While in large polities they can never replace the 
representative mechanisms of output legitimacy, there will be an increasing need to enhance 
the parliamentary embeddedness of Dutch officials within EU institutions to ensure better 
political legitimacy for their outputs. Moreover, direct democratic instruments such as 
referendums will need to play a larger role in producing the required political legitimacy for 
further European integration and enlargement. 
 
A similar requirement follows from the dwindling influence of the Netherlands within the EU 
as a result of both enlargement and the changed European power constellation. Whereas 
before 1985 the general public could trust Dutch negotiators to arrive at European 
settlements that served the interests of the Netherlands almost automatically, since that time 
that is no longer the case. The ensuing politicization of European issues during the 1990s, of 
the introduction of the cash euro and of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 clearly indicate a 
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mismatch between public expectations and actual deliveries. Apparently, Dutch politicians 
have failed to instill within their constituents a new sense of realism about what they can 
accomplish within the changed European arena. Seen from a Dutch perspective, European 
integration is no longer a positive sum game as it was in the 1950s, 1960’s, 1970s and even 
1980s, but has become a zero sum game with real distributive consequences. While it is 
surely too strong to claim that that has been true for the introduction of the cash euro in and 
of itself, since in the eyes of the Dutch public the euro has become an icon of the process of 
European integration as such, in an indirect fashion it obviously is. As is demonstrated by the 
success of the SP to ‘frame’ the euro as a monetarist and hence neoliberal complot against 
Dutch citizens, because of linkages between different policy domains no domain is any longer 
immune of politicization. In other words, policy makers can no longer expect that their 
‘framing’ of a particular policy issue as being a matter of pure technical problem solving will 
go uncontested for long. As a result, the legitimacy requirements within the Netherlands of 
European policy making across the board has increased enormously. European integration 
can no longer be presented as a functional process, but has to be defended as an explicit 
political program. How, by whom, and for what ends, are questions that fall outside the scope 
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